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This article analyzes through qualitative content analysis what role the populist 
radical right parties have had in Scandinavian immigration debate in the press from 
1970 to 2016. The press may highlight other dimensions of these parties’ relation-
ship with the immigration issue than party programs and statements. I identify six 
distinct roles the parties have performed in the debate: the radical traditionalist, 
the deviant, the extremist, the powerful (against the little guy), the persecuted, 
and the policy innovator. Showing that the populist radical right parties are not 
just exchanging the same set of familiar arguments with their political opponents 
over and over again, this analysis adds to our understanding of how these parties 
debate immigration and the kinds of criticism they draw, and it shows that the 
immigration issue can actually lead to highly unfavorable media coverage that goes 
beyond their policy radicalism, which I suggest could hurt their electoral prospects. 
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Introduction
Existing research shows that opposition to immigration is a defining attribute of populist 
radical right parties—according to Ivarsflaten (2007), it is the only common denominator of 
those that are electorally successful and the primary reason voters support them (Arzheimer 
2018). It manifests itself in all three overarching attributes by which this party family has 
become known: immigrants are excluded from their notion of the people they see themselves 
as advocates for (populism); these parties advocate ethnocracy and therefore major changes 
to immigration policies (radicalism); and, relatedly, they are socio-culturally ethno-pluralists 
(right-wing) (Betz & Johnson 2004; Canovan 1999; Elgenius & Rydgren 2018; Minkenberg 
2000; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; van Spanje 2010). While party programs, propaganda, 
and expert surveys have been indispensable data types for this research, press coverage of the 
anti-immigrant parties over time represents a somewhat underexplored, but potentially rich, 
data source that speaks to the parties’ ideological and policy positions, the kinds of response 
they trigger from their political opponents, and the electoral significance of the immigration 
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issue for them. The press is a main arena for the public deliberation over the immigration 
issue and for the populist radical right parties to reach the electorate and gain support for 
their take on immigration. While party programs and public statements let them present 
and explain the issue as they prefer—an overall message, the most salient aspects, the short-
comings of the opponents, and so forth—the press may present the party and its views and 
representatives much differently, for a number of reasons. Therefore, in this article, I analyze 
through qualitative content analysis what role the populist radical right parties have had in 
the Scandinavian immigration debate in the press from 1970 to 2016, using the SCANPUB 
dataset. ‘Role’ refers to the functions they have (had) in the immigration debate by virtue of 
the subjects they appear in the context of; what is factually written about them, including 
statements by others; and what statements the parties themselves make in relation to the 
subjects, as evident in intra- or cross-national patterns in the data. To the extent that press 
articles reveal roles that complement what existing research tends to highlight, namely that 
the populist radical right parties in the public arena are outspoken critics of immigration, 
press coverage can be an important supplementary source of insight into how these parties 
relate to the immigration issue. This is not to suggest existing research is incorrect but that 
press articles could link the parties to the immigration issue in other ways and thus put them 
in additional roles beyond that of the immigration critic—roles that could affect their elec-
toral prospects in ways hitherto not fully appreciated, which future research must examine. 
The data consist of 131 news items, columns, and editorials in six Scandinavian newspapers 
that quoted or mentioned either of the two Progress parties, the Danish People’s Party, New 
Democracy, and the Sweden Democrats. These parties are generally considered representa-
tive of Western populist radical right parties as a category (see e.g., Rydgren 2007), and they 
operate in media systems that share characteristics with several other European countries 
(Hallin & Mancini 2004). The findings can therefore be valid for other parties of this variety 
in similar contexts, although this must be examined in future research. I identified six dis-
tinct roles that Scandinavian populist radical right parties have in actuality performed in the 
press debate over immigration over the 47-year period, at some point and in all or particular 
countries, whether they sought the role themselves or have involuntarily been assigned it by 
other public actors. The roles were those of the radical traditionalist, the deviant, the extrem-
ist, the powerful (against the little guy), the persecuted, and the policy innovator. Showing that 
the populist radical right parties are not just exchanging the same set of familiar arguments 
with their political opponents over and over again, this analysis adds to our understanding of 
how these parties debate immigration and the kinds of criticism they draw, and it shows that 
the immigration issue can lead to highly unfavorable media coverage that goes beyond their 
policy radicalism, which I suggest could hurt their electoral prospects.
The article is organized as follows. First, I present the issue of immigration as a policy issue 
and how the populist radical right relates to it. I then review past research on the Scandinavian 
populist radical right parties and the immigration issue, including related recent work on 
media coverage. Data and method are presented in the third section, followed by a contextu-
alizing discussion of why the national context can be expected to shape press coverage of the 
parties. I then present and discuss the roles of the Scandinavian parties in the immigration 
debate over the 47-year period. Findings and implications are discussed in the conclusion. 
The Immigration Issue and Populist Radical Right Parties
The influx of labor migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers into Western Europe since the 
1970s put the challenging issue of immigration high on the political agenda (for an over-
view, see Hovden & Mjelde 2019b). Immigration is a particularly complex issue with social, 
Mjelde: The Six Roles of the Anti-Immigration Parties in Scandinavian Immigration 
Press Debate 1970–2016
3
cultural, economic, and moral aspects that blends into most if not all other policy domains, 
involving subjects and themes such as racism, foreign aid, individual rights, national culture, 
changing social and cultural patterns, moral values, crime, poverty, religion, the educational 
system, the future of the welfare state, and so forth. It involves some very difficult political 
dilemmas, such as, on the one hand, the desire to help people in dire need and giving people 
the opportunity to create a better life for themselves, and on the other hand, wanting to 
avoid new social problems, increased public expenditures, and social unrest. For example, the 
unemployment rate has long been higher among immigrants than the native-born popula-
tion (OECD 2004; 2016).
While populist radical right parties are not single-issue parties and several of them emerged 
around entirely different issues (see e.g., Harmel, Svåsand & Mjelde 2018; Mudde 1999), they 
were quick to seize on grievances over immigration and embraced the idea of ethno-plural-
ism—the view that different ethnic groups should stay separate to preserve their culture, 
which was elaborated by the French Nouvelle Droite and is now the foremost characteris-
tic of the party family (Rydgren 2005). Populist radical right parties use five anti-immigrant 
frames/arguments, according to Elgenius and Rydgren (2018; see also Rydgren 2007). First, 
immigrants crowd out natives in the competition for limited goods, for example taking over 
jobs and housing; second, they are a burden to the welfare state, due in particular to high 
unemployment rates, thus taxing resources that could have gone to the native population; 
third, they bring crime and social unrest; fourth, they bring foreign customs and values 
that threaten to undermine national culture and identity; fifth, they threaten liberal values. 
Moreover, their anti-immigration stance manifests itself in all three overarching attributes 
by which the party family is identified. The parties present themselves as speaking on behalf 
of ‘the people’ against all the elites, yet immigrants are excluded from their concept of the 
demos. Their radicalism is first and foremost evident in their ethnocratic vision of the ideal 
society and the major changes to immigration policies that they consequently favor. Finally, 
and relatedly, these parties’ non-egalitarian, particularistic attitude to immigrants and their 
place in society (i.e., their ethnopluralism) is a critical element of what makes them socio-
culturally right wing (see Betz & Johnson 2004; Canovan 1999; Elgenius & Rydgren 2018; 
Minkenberg 2000; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; van Spanje 2010). Next, I review the existing 
research on the Scandinavian populist radical right parties as it relates to the immigration 
issue. 
Literature on the Scandinavian Populist Radical Right Parties, the 
Immigration Issue, and the Media and Public Debate
The growing literature on the Scandinavian populist radical right parties give an account of 
the emergence of the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway in the early 1970s as right-
wing protest parties of entrepreneurial origins. It shows that they gradually incorporated the 
immigration issue into their policy profiles, when the character and volume of immigration 
to these countries changed markedly with the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees.1 By 
contrast, early research on the Swedish case focused on explaining the absence of a successful 
populist radical right party, save for the flash in the pan party New Democracy, which burst 
onto the political scene in 1991 and imploded within three years. The Sweden Democrats, 
 1 Gripsrud (2018) argues the Norwegian Progress Party’s opposition to immigration was manifest already in the 
1970s, as evident for example in party founder Anders Lange’s defense of the apartheid regime in South Africa, 
statements made by Progress Party MP Erik Gjems-Onstad in the 1974 parliamentary debate on the immigration 
moratorium, and in a letter to the editor arguing against a new mosque in Oslo by party leader Carl I. Hagen in 
Aftenposten in 1979.
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founded in 1988 and entering parliament in 2010, has received abundant attention in recent 
years, however. The studies discuss the electoral significance of the immigration issue to 
these parties and opposition to immigration as an attribute that defines them as a party 
type. For instance, the 1987 election is commonly regarded as the first in which immigra-
tion was politicized in Norway, and the moderation process within the Sweden Democrats 
in the 2000s allowed the party to grow its appeal (Andersen & Bjørklund 2000; Bergmann 
2017; Dahlström & Esaiasson 2011; Erlingsson, Vernby & Öhrvall 2014; Harmel, Svåsand & 
Mjelde 2018; Hellstrøm 2016; Ivarsflaten 2007; Ivarsflaten & Gudbrandsen 2012; Jungar & 
Jupskås 2014; Rydgren 2002, 2010; Rydgren & van der Meiden 2018; Widfeldt 2000, 2018). 
A small number of single-case studies deal with the nature and dimensions of these parties’ 
anti-immigration stance in depth, such as Elgenius and Rydgren (2018) and Jupskås (2015). 
As mentioned, Elgenius and Rydgren, building in part on Rydgren’s earlier work (Rydgren 
2007), find that the Sweden Democrats’ message features nostalgic, etho-nationalistic frames 
and Jupskås finds that five anti-immigration ‘narratives’ have been used by the Norwegian 
Progress Party. Another set of related studies has analyzed other Scandinavian parties’ strate-
gic responses to the populist radical right’s successful mobilization on the immigration issue, 
focusing on the structure of party competition in Denmark and Sweden (Green-Pedersen & 
Krogstrup 2008; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2008; Widfeldt 2015) or the response of the 
social democrats (Bale et al. 2010) to explain the early politicization of the immigration issue 
in Denmark and the absence thereof in Sweden. Finally, several studies have looked at what 
role the media have played in the growth of the Scandinavian populist radical right parties 
and, in turn, how the parties have shaped press coverage. Two main findings are first, that 
the media have facilitated their electoral breakthrough, giving them visibility by covering 
the issues these parties raise. Second, the media bestow legitimacy by covering them as seri-
ous actors, particularly when the media engage in populism themselves (Mjelde & Hovden 
2019; Bächler & Hopmann 2017; Ellinas 2010; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Hellstrøm 
& Belevander 2018; Jupskås et al. 2017; Mazzoleni 2008; Mudde 2007; Strömbäck, Jungar 
& Dahlberg 2017), even though one study concludes that Swedish editorials were clearly 
more critical in their tone towards the parties than Danish and Norwegian ones (Hellström, 
Hagelund & Meret 2016). Moreover, (Hovden & Mjelde 2019b) show the Scandinavian popu-
list radical right parties have been leading actors in the politicization of the immigration 
debate in the press in all three countries from 1970 to 2016, and (Mjelde & Hovden 2019), 
using the same data, also find that press articles are more likely to contain populism when 
the populist radical-right parties are either speaking or spoken about in the articles.
Data and Method
The press articles were drawn from 4406 news, feature, and debate items about immigra-
tion to and migration within Scandinavia and Europe collected by the SCANPUB pro-
ject for a quantitative content analysis of Scandinavian immigration debate from 1970 to 
2016. The sample consisted of the broadsheets Aftenposten (NO), Dagens Nyheter (SE), and 
Jyllandsposten (DK) and the tabloids VG (NO), Aftonbladet (SE), and Ekstrabladet (DK). As 
political leanings appeared most evident in the Danish press, a limited sample of Politiken 
was added to balance the Danish sample. Articles that explicitly or implicitly dealt with post-
1960 immigration in the context of 26 different topics, such as the welfare state and labor 
market policies, integration, admission policy, media representation, multiculturalism, crime, 
religion, and social customs, were selected, relying on constructed week-sampling of 24 days 
each year throughout the 47-year period, which resulted in a database covering 5640 news-
paper weekdays (only every 5th year for Politiken). Trained student assistants in each country 
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selected and coded the items from November 2016 to February 2018.2 The secondary sample, 
analyzed here, included all news items, columns, and editorials that the assistants coded as 
explicitly quoting or mentioning either of the two Progress parties, the Danish People’s Party, 
New Democracy, and the Sweden Democrats, in total 131 (out of the original 4406).3
Whereas Hovden and Mjelde (2019b) have analyzed the full sample quantitatively, I analyze 
the role of these parties in the Scandinavian immigration debate—the secondary sample—
through qualitative content analysis in a general and evaluative sense of the method by sys-
tematically examining the data for the purpose of categorizing the contents and registering 
data that were relevant to the research question. Thus, the analysis was inductive: I sought 
to derive concepts or themes—what I in the end characterized as roles—through interpreta-
tion of the newspaper articles (see Grønmo 2004; Kuckartz 2014; Thomas 2006). I first read 
all articles two times and determined what the subject of the piece was; what was factually 
written about the parties, including statements by others; and what (if any) statements they 
themselves made about the matter. When there was an intra- or cross-national pattern in 
terms of the subject matter, how the populist radical right parties discussed it, or in how 
other actors responded to them, in turn, I considered that to be a role that the populist 
radical right effectively performed and characterized it accordingly and selected the most 
instructive item(s) to exemplify. The roles were thus inferred from the empirical material for 
the group as a whole, even though not every role was evident in each country. If, for instance, 
several stories cover some type of a connection between neo-Nazi groups and a populist radi-
cal right party, the party itself may be said to perform the function of the extremist in the 
immigration debate, relative to other (mainstream) parties in the debate, to the extent that 
it condones extremists or acquiesces in extremist ideology, even if its party program is not 
extremist in any way. The connection may involve only one or a few party representatives, but 
the association between the party and extremists is then made in the public debate, fairly 
or unfairly. Moreover, the articles do not deal to the same extent or throughout the period 
with the same roles. Accordingly, some of the roles are exemplified with multiple examples; 
in the case of the policy innovator, I only found one example. In this specific case, the article 
concerns policy innovation in the sole municipality in Norway with a Progress Party mayor 
after the 1999 election, who was considered a rising star in the party. Such policy innovation 
has contributed to the municipality being dubbed ‘the showcase’ for the Progress Party’s 
policies, a label that has stuck in the Norwegian public sphere ever since (see e.g., Gilbrant 
2019; Westhrin 1999). The article thus exemplifies this role. The purpose is not to quantify 
but to present and discuss each distinct role that I identified through the use of instructive 
examples, which I do after the next section, which suggests how the national context can be 
expected to impact the debate in each country. 
The National Context: Similarities and Differences
The Scandinavian immigration debate in the press has taken place in political and media con-
texts both similar and dissimilar. Existing literature generally treats the five populist radical 
right parties studied here as both a distinct party family within the Scandinavian political sys-
tem (e.g., Jungar & Jupskås 2014) and as a subset of the European populist radical right (e.g., 
 2 For an extended account of the sampling, see the SCANPUB representative analysis methodology report (Hovden 
& Mjelde 2019a).
 3 Letters to the editor were excluded due to the large increase in the number of such articles in the period in com-
bination with the many particularities of this genre, including both its form (e.g., often being very short, which 
means that the items will have fewer subjects and sources), who writes them (‘ordinary people’ as opposed to 
bona fide journalists, experts, and elites), their looser connection to the daily news agenda, etc.
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Rydgren 2018). The three countries’ media systems all belong to the so-called ‘democratic-
corporatist model’, characterized by high newspaper circulation, a (now) politically neutral 
commercial press, strong media/journalistic professionalization, and both institutionalized 
self-regulation and strong state intervention, including protection of freedom of the press 
(Hallin & Mancini 2004). Populist radical right parties tend to be newsmakers, because immi-
gration is a divisive issue that has been increasingly covered in Scandinavia (Hovden & Mjelde 
2019b), and the parties have been led by charismatic leaders that use provocative rhetoric 
(Esser, Stępińska & Hopmann, 2017; Mazzoleni 2008; Strömback, Jungar & Dahlgren 2017). 
Moreover, Hellstrøm, Hagelund and Meret (2016) find newspaper editorials in all the coun-
tries tend to portray the parties in a more negative tone when immigration is the subject. 
Taken together, these features suggest the parties are comparable in terms of the positions 
they take and with regard to the media environment in which they operate. One can thus 
expect them to play at least some of the same roles in the immigration debate. On the other 
hand, the parties’ histories differ, as do the political and national media contexts in some ways. 
First, the Norwegian Progress Party is arguably more of a mainstream party. It is more ideo-
logically moderate, at least compared to the Danish People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats 
(Jungar & Jupskås 2014; Mudde 2007), was institutionalized as a party organization by the 
early 1990s (Harmel, Svåsand & Mjelde 2018), and has been in parliament continuously since 
1981 and was the junior partner in the coalition government from 2013 to 2020. Second, 
Denmark has had a harsher and more critical public discourse towards immigrants (Hovden 
& Mjelde 2019b; Hovden, Mjelde & Gripsrud 2018), likely in part related to the presence 
of comparatively stronger free (advertisement-based) papers and classic tabloid newspapers, 
unlike their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts, and the earlier politicization of the immi-
gration issue there (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008). Third, the Sweden Democrats is a 
special party due to its neo-Nazi origins. This has led to the other parties forming a cordon 
sanitaire against it and most likely also newspaper editorials being more negative toward it 
(Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Hellstrøm, Hagelund & Meret 2016). Moreover, Swedish 
immigration discourse has been characterized by more immigration-friendly views (Hovden 
& Mjelde 2019b; Hovden, Mjelde & Gripsrud 2018). In fact, what Brochmann and Hagelund 
(2012) refer to as a ‘kindness continuum’ within the region—Sweden having the most liberal 
immigration policies, Denmark the most restrictive, with Norway somewhere in between—
applies also to the tone of their immigration discourses, according to Hovden and Mjelde 
(2019b). These intra-Scandinavian differences could shape how the parties are covered in 
each of the countries.
The Roles of the Scandinavian Populist Radical Right Parties in the Press 
Debate, 1970–2016
I identified six distinct roles that Scandinavian populist radical right parties have in actuality 
performed in the press debate over immigration over the 47-year period, at some point and 
in all or particular countries, whether they sought the role themselves or have involuntarily 
been assigned it by other public actors. 
The Radical Traditionalist
Unsurprisingly, the most typical role of the populist radical right parties in the debate has 
been the one for which they have become known: the defender of the national culture of 
the native-born population against the threats immigrants (allegedly) represent, who there-
fore calls for far more restrictive immigration policies. Multiple example stories across the 
three countries show this. In an interview with Aftenposten, the prominent Progress Party 
MP John Alvheim calls for the deportation from Norway of all asylum seekers in Norway who 
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have been granted humanitarian protection. He is responding to the release of a report that 
shows that every fifth citizen will by 2050 be a person from the third world or a descendant 
thereof, if the current immigration policies remain in place. Alvheim intends to introduce a 
bill in parliament and says that ‘Norwegians risk becoming a minority in their own country’, 
and he is particularly worried about the potential influence of Islam in Norway (Ramberg 
1991). VG has a story in which a survey shows two in three Norwegians want to ban foreign 
flags in the national holiday parade. Progress Party leader Siv Jensen says foreign flags have 
no place in the parade, and she thinks many Norwegians will be upset by the desire of some 
to bring foreign flags (Maso, Bugge, Emelianow & Johansen 2008). In Sweden, the Sweden 
Democrats’ ethnopluralist ideology is the subject of a commentary in Dagens Nyheter, which 
contains a radical written formulation of it by the party itself: ‘Sweden is the Swedes’ country. 
By this, the Sweden Democrats are not saying that we think we Swedes are better than oth-
ers, we are only saying that Sweden is the only place on earth where we … can develop our 
own character and identity’ (Kempe 2009). In an interview on the day of his release from 
prison after serving time for tax evasion, Progress Party leader Mogens Glistrup offers the 
slogan-like statement ‘Denmark free of income tax and refugees’ (Ritterband 1985). A report 
in Politiken details widespread anti-Islam sentiments in a Facebook support group for for-
mer leader Pia Kjærsgaard, quoting several Danish People’s Party members making anti-Islam 
and anti-immigrant statements, with the group’s leader—a party member—proposing that ‘no 
immigrant 10 generations out should be eligible for city council or the Danish parliament’. 
Neither Kjæarsgaard or the current vice chair, Søren Espersen, want to comment on the con-
troversial statements, with the latter noting ‘It is the way it is’ (Vangkilde 2015). 
The Deviant
Several articles suggest the apparent paradox in these parties calling out all that is wrong 
with immigrants when their representatives suffer from their own personal shortcomings. 
These stories portray the parties’ representatives and members as deviant, outlandish, or 
wacky. A piece in Extra Bladet, bordering on ridicule, with the thematic subtitle ‘Hullabaloo 
at Kjærsgaard’—a play on the name of party leader Pia Kjærsgaard—states that a candidate for 
the Danish People’s Party left his Muslim wife to further his own political career, although he 
denies this accusation. Based on this case, the article offers the generalization ‘Muslim wife 
[is] an obstacle when seeking election to parliament for the Danish People’s Party’ (Olesen 
2000). Jyllandsposten reports from the Danish Progress Party’s infamous 1995 ‘party con-
ference from hell’4—a nickname reflecting the party was about to implode from internal 
strife and weak institutionalization. In the story, the delegates’ eccentricity and opposition 
to immigration are discussed in the same section, the implication being that these are two 
defining characteristics that make the party stand out. The journalists comment on the del-
egates’ memorable outfits, and one delegate offers that with respect to the general elector-
ate, ‘The weirdos are with us’. Several delegates have reportedly told them that many party 
members feel they are wrongly seen as racists (Beck & Steinmetz 1995). An unflattering story 
in Aftonbladet discusses welfare dependency among Sweden Democrats. Under the head-
line ‘Get welfare – in the millions’, the story points out that the party ‘thinks that immi-
gration costs too much. But they themselves live off welfare’, emphasizing that one in five 
elected Sweden Democrats is reliant on welfare. Three figures show that Sweden Democrat-
politicians earn less than the national average, more often owe money to the debt collection 
service, and have a higher payment delinquency rate than representatives of other parties 
(Buskas & Kärrman 2007).
 4 This was a nickname used on the conference by the public (see Harmel, Svåsand and Mjelde 2018: 120).




Extremism/racism among the parties themselves and ties to extremist groups are reported in 
a number of articles. A VG article reports that the Progress Party, as the only Norwegian party, 
does not ban members of the anti-immigrant association the People’s Movement Against 
Immigration (FMI), whose leader was arrested just months before (and later convicted) for 
planning to bomb a refugee center, from joining the party. Whereas representatives from 
all the other Norwegian parties reject FMI members—with some making clear in no uncer-
tain terms that FMI members are banned from their parties—Progress Party leader Carl I. 
Hagen says there is nothing in his party’s statutes barring FMI representatives from joining 
his party. Hagen goes on to distance himself from the FMI in a rather vague way, noting that 
he has mixed feelings about its leader encouraging its members to vote for the Progress Party 
(Talsnes 1989). An item in Dagens Nyheter titled ‘The Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric resembles 
nazism’s’ has a professor making that comparison after the party described the country’s 
growing Muslim population as the largest threat against Sweden since the Second World War 
(Kihlström 2009). There are multiple stories about scandalous behavior by prominent mem-
bers of the Sweden Democrats, with one inebriated Sweden Democrat leader, Erik Almqvist, 
caught on camera making racist statements (Samuelsen 2012). Another, Kent Ekeroth—inci-
dentally the one doing the recording in the previous example—is in hot water for raising funds 
for Avpixlat, an alternative radical right wing media website accused of spreading hatred 
against immigrants (Sköld, Wiman & Sandberg 2012). Aftenposten reports that prominent 
Danish People’s Party politician Mogens Camre has been convicted of sending out a tweet 
in which he says that Muslims should get the same treatment that Hitler got, and that the 
Danish People’s Party has stated that the verdict will not have any consequences for Camre’s 
future in the party (Færås 2015).
The Powerful (Against the Little Guy)
Both the Norwegian and Danish parties appear in stories in which they wield the levers of gov-
ernmental or partisan political power against (vulnerable) immigrants. After the Norwegian 
Progress Party entered government in 2013, several stories feature party representatives now 
in official roles, often as ministers, defending government practices with adverse effects on 
individual immigrants. An article in VG reports that a Syrian family with an ill five-year old 
daughter in a refugee center close to the Russian border, where the family made a crossing 
into Norway, has been taken into custody by the Norwegian police. They are facing a possible 
forced return to Russia, with uncertain consequences for their human rights, which their 
Norwegian lawyer claims the government policy framework violates. The minister of immi-
gration and integration, the Progress Party’s Sylvi Listhaug, responds that she has no concern 
about returning them to Russia, arguing that the government considers it a safe third country 
and cites the parliamentary consensus behind the applicable government policy (Haugsbø & 
Mikkelsen 2016). Aftenposten also has a story about the Norwegian government sending an 
observer to Eritrea and efforts to reach an agreement with the Eritrean government to provide 
for the return of asylum seekers from the country, which according to the UN is a large-scale 
violator of human rights that commits crimes against humanity. An Eritrean woman running 
a radio program described as somewhat of a hotline for Eritreans on the run is strongly criti-
cal of the Norwegian government. The Progress Party’s vice minister of justice, Jøran Kallmyr, 
defends the government’s work, despite being aware that the returning refugees are forced 
by the Eritrean government to sign an ‘admission of guilt’ letter (Stokke & Aale 2016). In 
Denmark, an article in Jyllandsposten features the story of a stateless Palestinian who nearly 
obtained citizenship under a 1961 UN convention when his case began to languish within 
the bureaucracy, which his lawyer blames on the alleged intervention by the Danish People’s 
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Party to prevent him and other stateless persons from obtaining Danish citizenship. The party 
rejects the accusation but immediately introduces legislation to withdraw Denmark from the 
UN convention that provides for citizenship for stateless persons (Skytt 2011). 
The Persecuted
Representatives of the populist radical right have themselves played the role of the victim 
who is persecuted by the public because of their political beliefs, and not without basis. A 
story in Jyllandsposten covers the court battles of Danish People’s Party leader Pia Kjærsgaard, 
where she has twice sued and won defamation cases against a political opponent and a news-
paper editor, respectively. Both accused her of being a racist, the latter in the aftermath of 
an episode in Copenhagen in which she was attacked by 150 teenagers throwing rocks at 
her when she was about to meet a journalist to talk about immigration (Grønvald 2000). 
In a comment, Kjærsgaard states: ‘I hope my political opponents now, after a second clear 
verdict, will hold back before they barge ahead and make defamatory and vulgar statements 
against me personally and the Danish People’s Party’, adding that she has had to pay a steep 
personal price because people such as the one she sued make her out to be ‘the icon of evil’. 
An article in Ekstra Bladet describes the case of a Sweden Democrat candidate for the Swedish 
parliament seeking asylum in Denmark after allegedly receiving death threats. He first won 
a wrongful termination court case against the Swedish Migration Agency, where he once 
worked, that involved criticism he had made against the government’s asylum policies. Now 
he claims he is being silenced by the media as a candidate for the Sweden Democrats and that 
his car and home have been vandalized, adding that he fears he will suffer the same fate as 
Pim Fortuyn (Michaelsen 2002). 
The Policy Innovator
The Scandinavian populist radical right has occasionally introduced significant policy propos-
als in the area of immigration that eventually became governmental policy, in spite of con-
demnation and ostracization from other parties. A VG article in 2000 with the headline ‘Puts 
price tag on refugees’ features an interview with the country’s then only Progress Party mayor, 
Terje Søviknes, whose administration was the first in the country to produce an accounting of 
the financial costs for his municipality of taking in refugees. The mayor states that he believes 
other mayors wish to do the same but do not dare (Landsend 2000). Notably, this proposal 
was a local variant of national Progress Party policy. In 1995, the Norwegian Progress Party 
MP Øystein Hedstrøm introduced a parliamentary resolution that called for a governmen-
tal study of the effects of immigration on the Norwegian society, written with input from 
anti-immigration activists, reportedly including the leader of the racist party White Electoral 
Alliance, Jack Erik Kjuus—and notably followed up in part by both left- and right-wing gov-
ernments in the form of two official reports about the consequences of mass immigration 
(Gripsrud 2018).
Discussion and Conclusion
Populist radical right parties are defined in large part by their sweeping opposition to immi-
gration, which can be summarized by a set of distinct frames/arguments (cf. Elgenius & 
Rydgren 2018; Rydgren 2007). This analysis of the Scandinavian populist radical right parties 
role in immigration debate in the press since the very beginning of non-Western immigration 
to the region, which found that they have effectively taken on six different roles here, both 
supports and adds to this understanding of the parties. There are plenty of examples in the 
material of the parties making anti-immigrant statements that echo the familiar arguments 
discussed by past research and that is expressed in party programs—what I here termed the 
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role of the radical traditionalist. At times, they have occupied a much more marginal position 
in the debate, having been cast in or taken the role of the extremist. The other roles identi-
fied here reveal new facets to the parties’ position in the immigration debate, which plausibly 
could impact how they are perceived by the public beyond the issue of immigration. 
First, the harsh attacks on immigrants invite journalistic scrutiny of the personal character 
of the parties’ own representatives, which has led to an unflattering highlighting of their 
own flaws and peculiarities, making them appear deviant relative to the average citizen out 
there. Second, and in stark contrast to the conventional understanding of these parties as self-
pronounced champions of the man and woman in the street, their assumption of powerful 
government positions has placed them in the role of the powerful political establishment, 
representing and defending the system against vulnerable individual immigrants. While the 
populist radical right parties exclude (non-Western) immigrants from their concept of the 
people, the case of the Norwegian Progress Party clearly shows that entering government 
can entail political accountability and the use of power that fly in the face of their image 
as the voice of the downtrodden. Third, in a sort of weird role-reversal, the parties have at 
times invoked the plight of the persecuted, effectively placing themselves in the kind of place 
that many immigrants find themselves as victims of political oppression. Thus, when they 
embrace the role of the victim, their political fight against immigration renders them weak 
and vulnerable. This could, on the other hand, also reinforce their populist image as (yet) 
another example of injustice suffered at the hands of powerful political forces trying to sup-
press the beliefs of average people—in this case popular resentment against immigration. 
Fourth, the parties have also been reformers introducing new political ideas that were later 
widely embraced. Thus, in contrast to the perception that the parties are backwards-looking 
and stand for retrograde policies, they have also contributed innovative, impactful ideas in 
the area of immigration that bring public policy forward, as measured by their adoption by 
mainstream parties. 
These findings imply, first, immigration is an issue that could exacerbate the liability that 
the immigration issue potentially is for populist radical right parties. While their stance on 
immigration undoubtedly attracts a significant number of voters, it alienates other voters 
and could even lead other parties to reject any cooperation with them, as in the case of the 
Sweden Democrats. If they, on top of this, are also seen as extreme, deviant, or cruel, it is at 
least thinkable that anti-immigration appeals may in fact hurt these parties electorally to the 
extent that they draw attention to behavior by party representatives that some voters may not 
condone, even if the voters are generally sympathetic to the parties’ views on immigration. 
For example, the immigration issue could undermine their populist image if it makes the 
parties into the face of an inhumane political system. Second, the immigration issue could, 
on the other hand, help them sand down their rough image to the extent that it puts them 
in the role of the ‘underdog’ and thus creates public sympathy for them or allows them to 
be seen in a positive light as disruptors who contribute bold, innovative ideas that benefit 
society. Future studies must test these propositions while taking the national context into 
consideration. 
While the six roles identified above speak to the party family as a whole at a general, abstract 
level, not every party was found to have had every role in the Scandinavian debate. For exam-
ple, the Norwegian Progress Party is the only one that has been in executive office, which 
has had the effect of making it a part of the political establishment that implements policies 
that sometimes have dramatic effects on individual immigrants, as shown above. The Danish 
People’s Party has also been in this role, but government participation most clearly contrib-
utes to it when it entails ministerial influence over immigration policy implementation. The 
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Sweden Democrats will also much more easily glide into the role of the extremist, given its 
neo-Nazi roots and the predominance of immigration-friendly views in the Swedish discourse. 
Finally, a more socially stratified public discourse in Denmark has likely contributed to deri-
sive depictions of populist radical right parties and their members. Which roles a particular 
party plays will therefore to some degree be contingent upon the specific circumstances that 
shape its country’s immigration debate. Future research should also attempt to quantify to 
what extent the parties have played the roles this article has only identified but not counted 
in the sense of frequencies for the population—which could be the debate in all national 
and regional newspapers in the countries—as that will likely matter for how the various roles 
impact the parties’ standing with voters. Furthermore, future work should also examine 
what roles other parties of this family have played in the press debate over immigration in 
their countries to test the generalizability of the findings from the Scandinavian context and 
possibly to identify additional roles. 
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